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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
Judge Andrew Napolitano said recently of unmanned aircraft
systems (“UAS”), or “drones,” 1 that “[t]he first American patriot that
shoots down one of these drones that comes too close to his children in his
backyard will be an American hero.”2

* Author Robert H. Gruber is a litigation associate at Greenberg Traurig, LLP. This
article is presented for informational purposes only, and it is not intended to be construed
or used as general legal advice nor as a solicitation of any type. The author gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of Jordan Grotzinger, Adam Siegler, John Villasenor, and
Ivan Perkins.
1

Drones are also commonly referred to as “UAVs” or “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.” See
Matt McFarland, Here’s What Drone Advocates Love and Hate About the FAA’s
Proposed Rules, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2015, 6:57 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/wp/2015/02/15/heres-what-droneadvocates-love-and-hate-about-the-faas-proposed-rules/, archived at
http://perma.cc/L2TD-JTTD (using “drone” “UAV” and “UAS” as interchangeable
terms). This article uses “drone,” “UAV,” and “UAS” more or less interchangeably, but
with “UAS” referring to the entire system (including the operator), and “UAV” referring
to the aircraft alone.
2

Steve Watson, Judge Napolitano: First Patriot to Shoot Down a Government Spy Drone
Will Be a Hero, INFOWARS.COM (May 16, 2012), http://www.infowars.com/judgenapolitano-first-patriot-to-shoot-down-a-government-spy-drone-will-be-a-hero/, archived
at http://perma.cc/RTP7-4MMM.
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[2]
If you sympathize with that sentiment, you are not alone. Much of
the discourse on domestic drone use has been informed by concerns over
privacy implications. 3 The judge’s statement epitomizes a kind of visceral
reaction—one that many share—to the idea of unmanned aircraft
monitoring our every activity. In the broadest sense, this article invites
readers to question that reaction. Why would one fly a drone into an
ordinary citizen’s backyard? Wouldn’t safety regulations (and existing
privacy laws) prohibit that behavior? Should we really be shooting these
things out of the sky?
[3]
Congress has instructed the Federal Aviation Administration
(“FAA”) to present a plan for integrating UAS into American airspace by
September 2015.4 Right now, UAS are authorized for only a handful of
uses, primarily public entities. 5 Commercial UAS are prohibited, 6 with
few exceptions7—although this is likely to change when the FAA’s most
recent proposed rules go into effect.8

3

See, e.g., Chris Schlag, The New Privacy Battle: How the Expanding Use of Drones
Continues to Erode Our Concept of Privacy and Privacy Rights, 13 PITTSBURGH J. TECH.
L. & POL'Y 1, 22 (2013) (arguing that “proactive steps should be taken by both the
Legislature and the Judiciary to ensure individual privacy rights are not eroded with the
incorporation of [UAV] technology into our daily lives.”).
4

FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (2012).

5

See John Villasenor, Observations from Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and
Privacy, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 471–73 (2013).
6

Id. at 471.

7

See, e.g., Nick Lavars, U.S. Gives Hollywood Film Studios Green Light on Drone Use,
(Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.gizmag.com/us-hollywood-exemption-film-droneuse/33994/, archived at http://perma.cc/GEH3-TAVN.
GIZMAG

8

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (“NPRM”), 80 Fed. Reg. 9544,9590 (Feb. 23, 2015).
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[4]
At this stage, it is impossible to accurately predict the scope of the
future UAS industry. Its potential benefits are vast and varied: beyond
mere job creation, drones will contribute to efficiency in various industries
and aspects of society. This is particularly true in the commercial sphere,
where competition and innovation can drive progress towards functions
far removed from the individual surveillance people fear. UAS have
already proven useful in functions from crop monitoring 9 to gathering
atmospheric data.10 Domino’s Pizza made headlines when it announced
the development of delivery UAS systems, as have other companies—and
while some skeptics dismissed the press releases as “publicity stunts,”11 it
is not too difficult to imagine a future in which packages appear on our
doorstep out of the sky. 12 Recently, Facebook announced a plan that
epitomizes the benevolent possibilities of commercial UAS. 13 It has
9

See Chris Anderson, Agricultural Drones, Relatively Cheap Drones with Advanced
Sensors and Imaging Capabilities are Giving Farmers New Ways to Increase Yields and
Reduce Crop Damage, 17 MIT TECH. REV. 3, 58, 60, (2014) available at
www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/526491/agricultural-drones/, archived at
http://perma.cc/RA6G-FR8J.
10

See Tereza Pultarova, Atmospheric Research Drones Developed by U.K. scientists,
E&T (Aug. 2, 2013), http://eandt.theiet.org/news/2013/aug/atmoshperic-drones.cfm,
archived at http://perma.cc/AMW3-LTYX.
11

See, e.g., David Hambling, Drone Deliveries: Beyond the Publicity Stunt, WIRED (Apr.
6, 2014), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-04/06/drone-deliveries, archived at
http://perma.cc/8ZZY-2WSW.
12

See Jenny Stanton, Drone Delivery Is Here! China’s Largest Mail Firm to Deliver
More Than 1,000 Packages A DAY to Remote Areas Using Fleet of Aircraft, DAILY MAIL
(Mar. 24, 2015, 11:28 AM), www.dailymail.co.uk/news/peoplesdaily/article3009593/Drone-delivery-China-s-largest-mail-firm-deliver-1-000-packages-DAYremote-areas-using-fleet-aircraft.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4GU9-7PBZ.
13

See Josh Constine, Facebook Will Deliver Internet Via Drones with “Connectivity
Lab” Project Powered by Acqhires from Ascenta, TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 27, 2014),
http://techcrunch.com/2014/03/27/facebook-drones/, archived at http://perma.cc/7N7SGEFJ; Victor Luckerson, Facebook Reportedly Wants to Buy a Drone Company, TIME
(Mar. 4, 2014), available at http://time.com/12395/facebook-drones-titan-aerospace/,
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purchased the U.K.-based company Ascenta, which manufactures solarpowered aircraft that can stay aloft at high altitudes for years at a time.
Facebook’s goal? Providing Internet access in areas where traditional
connections are impractical or impossible. 14 Even though commercial
UAS flight is still largely prohibited in the United States, the battle over
drone regulation has already begun, fixated largely on imagined harms to
people’s privacy. 15 And the privacy advocates are winning: more than
twenty states have passed laws restricting UAS operations. 16 Many of
these address law enforcement surveillance, but an increasing number of
states are proposing—and enacting—restrictions on private and
commercial aircraft. For example, a bill proposed and enrolled in Texas
makes it a misdemeanor to collect an image of a person’s land without
consent.17 Other states are considering similar legislation. 18 One town in
archived at http://perma.cc/HW6D-XSTM.
14

See Luckerson, supra note 13. In acquiring Ascenta, Facebook passed on Titan
Aerospace, a similar startup that was later snapped up by Google for the same purpose:
remote Internet service delivery.
15

See Villasenor, supra note 5, at 459–60, 487; see also Margot E. Kaminski, The Rules
of the Sky, SLATE (Feb. 25, 2015, 7:47 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/02/faa_small_commercial_dr
one_rules_don_t_adequately_address_privacy_concerns.single.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/3WMJ-SJZU (addressing the federal privacy issues and First Amendment
concerns regarding state privacy regulations likely to arise in light of the FAA’s “less
[than] stringent” proposed rules regulating small commercial drones).
16

See Rich Williams, Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 29, 2014), available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/civiland-criminal-justice/current-uas-state-law-landscape.aspx, archived at
http://perma.cc/XQH5-8W6P.
17

See Texas Privacy Act, H.B. No. 912, 83d Leg. (Tex. 2013).

18

See Allie Bohm, Status of 2014 Domestic Drone Legislation in the States, ACLU (Apr.
22, 2014, 10:32 AM), available at https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-andliberty/status-2014-domestic-drone-legislation-states, archived at https://perma.cc/5ENYV8C5?type=source [hereinafter Status of 2014 Domestic Drone Legislation] (providing a

4
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Colorado must have gotten Napolitano’s memo—it considered issuing
“drone hunting licenses” that would authorize its citizens to shoot any
unpiloted aircraft.19
[5]
This sort of legislation is both premature and problematic,
particularly with respect to the kind of drones that will be used for
commercial or civil purposes (as opposed to law enforcement purposes).
It is premature because legislators cannot foresee—and therefore cannot
balance—all of the potential benefits and harms of commercial drone use.
Many of the privacy interests purportedly advanced by restrictive
legislation are already protected by other areas of the law. 20 It is
problematic because inconsistent and overly-restrictive regulations (1)
potentially violate the First Amendment right to gather information and (2)
threaten to chill industry growth.21 The harms such legislation causes are
analogous, in a sense, to those that would have arisen if states had created
a patchwork of Internet privacy laws several years before the development
of the World Wide Web. 22 Right now, the United States leads the pack in
status chart with each state proposal).
19

See Nidhi Subbaraman, Open Season on Drones? Town Split over Licenses to Hunt
Unmanned Aircraft, NBC NEWS (Aug. 8, 2013, 3:36 PM),
http://www.21alive.com/nbc33/news/Open-Season-On-Drones-Licenses-To-HuntUnmanned-Aircraft-In-Colorado-218987751.html, archived at http://perma.cc/U6RP5VYZ.
20

See, e.g., Villasenor, supra note 5, at 498–508.

21

See Timothy M. Ravich, The Integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles into the
National Airspace, 85 N.D. L. REV. 597, 621 (2009) (“For the UAV industry to thrive,
insurers, engineers, manufacturers, operators, military tacticians, and other stakeholders
must have a firm and predictable set of laws that establish rights and liabilities emanating
from UAV operations.”).
22

See Villasenor, supra note 5, at 517 (“If, in 1995, comprehensive legislation to protect
Internet privacy had been enacted, it would have utterly failed to anticipate the
complexities that arose after the turn of the century with the growth of social networking
and location-based wireless services. The Internet has proven useful and valuable in

5
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UAS technology. If the current legislative pattern continues, the U.S.
might very well drive a market with incredible potential overseas, to more
open-minded nations.23
[6]
Is restrictive legislation nevertheless justified, as a means of
vindicating legitimate privacy interests?24 Perhaps not, particularly where
commercial UAS use is concerned.
There are few cognizable
circumstances in which using drones to monitor individual people will be
profitable for non-government actors and entities. 25 First, a primary
advantage of unmanned aircraft is that they can go swiftly and easily
where people cannot. UAS could be used profitably to survey mines,
monitor power lines in remote areas, collect traffic-flow information,
ways that were difficult to imagine over a decade and a half ago, and it has created
privacy challenges that were equally difficult to imagine. Legislative initiatives in the
mid-1990s to heavily regulate the Internet in the name of privacy would likely have
impeded its growth while also failing to address the more complex privacy issues that
arose years later.”).
23

See, e.g., Zenon Evans, Will the Government Test Drones in Your State?, REASON.COM
(Dec. 31, 2013, 2:19 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2013/12/31/will-the-government-testdrones-in-your, archived at http://perma.cc/N85J-Z7VY (“Brendan Schulman, who
works as special counsel for the drone industry, [said] ‘what we’ve experienced the past
several years is a lot of regulatory delay. In the meantime, other countries have moved
ahead with permitting and embracing commercial use. Countries
like Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom already have a framework for
commercial use of drones. That’s where you’ll see companies going to do the work.
That’s where you see investment dollars going.’”).
24

See generally Schlag, supra note 3, at 22 (arguing that “proactive steps should be taken
by both the Legislature and the Judiciary to ensure individual privacy rights are not
eroded with the incorporation of [UAS] technology into our daily lives.”).
25

Admittedly, drones could potentially be used to target celebrities. But there are ways
to prevent celebrities’ privacy from being invaded—California’s Anti-Paparazzi law is
one such example—that do not also restrict drone operations. To outlaw drone flights in
the pursuit of protecting celebrities’ privacy would be a bit like outlawing smartphones to
prevent people from hacking photographs.

6
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spray and monitor crops, and so forth. Some predict that eighty-percent of
commercial drones will be used for agricultural purposes 26 —so the
majority will seldom even accidentally interfere with individual privacy
interests. As one person put it, “corn doesn’t mind if you watch it.”27
Second, even if a particular commercial drone’s images could be
processed and linked to individuals’ identities, what would justify the cost
of such directed monitoring? Demographic information may be valuable,
but our phones and Internet activity paint a cheaper and more accurate
picture of consumer activities—where individuals go, where they shop,
and what they buy.
[7]
The global market for UAS is growing fast.28 At the moment, the
best available UAS technology belongs to the United States and Israel. 29
Developed for military purposes, this technology nevertheless has massive
export potential for civil and commercial uses.

26

See Christopher Doering, Growing Use of Drones Holds Promise of AG
Transformation, ARGUS LEADER (Mar. 30, 2014, 12:25 AM),
http://www.argusleader.com/story/news/2014/03/29/growing-use-drones-poisedtransform-agriculture/7073585/, archived at http://perma.cc/TW2Y-G6MX.
27

D.C. Denison, Maker Pro Newsletter - 10/17/13, MAKE: (Oct. 18, 2013, 4:45 PM),
http://makezine.com/2013/10/18/maker-pro-newsletter-10-17-13/, archived at
http://perma.cc/FND7-EW48.
28

See Benjamin Kapnik, Unmanned But Accelerating: Navigating the Regulatory and
Privacy Challenges of Introducing Unmanned Aircraft into the National Airspace
System, 77 J. AIR L. & COM. 439, 440–41 (2012) (“Annual worldwide unmanned aircraft
expenditures are expected to grow from $6.6 billion to $11.4 billion within a decade.
Although the market for civil use currently comprises less than 2% of the worldwide
market for unmanned aircraft, that could change over the next several years as technology
advances and as legislation and regulations allow broader use of unmanned aircraft in the
NAS.”).
29

See Tia Goldenberg, Israel Leads Global Drone Exports as Demand Grows, YAHOO
NEWS (June 5, 2013, 3:44 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/israel-leads-global-drone-exportsdemand-grows-194424173.html, archived at https://perma.cc/SN8N-435M?type=source.
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[8]
However, the United States’ monopoly on UAS technology may
already be eroding. In 2013 Israel surpassed the U.S. as the chief exporter
of UAS technology—although Israel remains second to the U.S. in
production.30 What accounts for this discrepancy? A regulatory barrier:
the companies that develop our military drones are restricted from
marketing their technology elsewhere. 31 China and other countries are
now entering the ring.32 By competing in the global market, the U.S. can
realize all the benefits of a multi-billion dollar industry once the FAA
opens up the national airspace33—which it is poised to begin doing soon—
but only if the U.S. avoids establishing a draconian regulatory framework
for commercial UAS.
[9]
This Article focuses on commercial UAS, and on the legal
frameworks—both current and potentially forthcoming—surrounding
30

Id.

31

See U.S. Drone Exporters Losing Out to Israeli, Chinese Competitors, HAMODIA, Feb.
14, 2014, at 6, available at http://hamodia.com/2014/02/13/u-s-drone-exporters-losingisraeli-chinese-competitors/, archived at http://perma.cc/94LW-5Z3A [hereinafter U.S.
Drone Exporters] (“Exports of drones are tightly controlled by an agreement signed by
members of a group called the Missile Technology Control Regime, which includes the
United States, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. The group has since
expanded to 34 countries but Israel and China aren’t members. . . . The controls give
rival drone makers from countries such as Israel and China a chance to win more
business in the growing global market for unmanned aerial vehicles, which one group
projects to more than double in the next decade. U.S. arms makers have been lobbying
the government for several years to loosen the restrictions so they can sell their systems
to more countries.”).
32

U.S. Drone Exporters, supra note 31.

33

Bill Wood, Wood on Plastics: Aerospace Market Losing Altitude, PLASTICS
TECHNOLOGY (July 2010), http://www.ptonline.com/columns/wood-on-plasticsaerospace-market-losing-altitude, archived at http://perma.cc/L2MB-DR3D. (“The U.S.
currently holds a tremendous edge in UAV technology and production, but Europe and
Asia are trying to catch up. Many analysts believe that the commercial potential for
UAV’s is nearly unlimited. The only glitch is getting access to civilian airspace.”).
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them. 34 Part I provides a brief background of the politically-charged
context within which UAS regulation is being developed. Part II
examines two critical issues in the UAS regulatory debate: (1) the extent
to which the “third-party doctrine” will apply to information captured by
commercial UAS; and (2) the boundaries of First Amendment protection
of “information gathering.” Part II also outlines existing state and federal
laws governing civil drone use. Part III examines approaches the United
States could take in regulating commercial drone use. Ultimately, the
article concludes that the federalism model will stifle the market for UAS
aircraft and technology, unless Congress acts to create a baseline federal
scheme that assuages privacy concerns without hindering industry growth.
II. BACKGROUND
[10] There is nothing novel about unmanned flight as a general concept.
As John Villasenor has put it, “model airplane hobbyists have known for
decades that an airplane can be flown without a human in the cockpit.”35
Nor is there anything new using aircraft, model or otherwise, to take
pictures: if someone visited a hobby store during the 1990’s, they might
have seen toy rockets outfitted with cameras. Light the fuse, watch the
rocket fire upwards, and once it drifted down (with the aid of a parachute),
one would be rewarded with a chip full of aerial views of the
neighborhood.
[11] The drones heard of today are simply an extension of this concept,
the natural result of improvements in communications and imaging
technology. 36 Even weaponized drones are not themselves a recent idea.
34

This Article uses “commercial,” “civil,” and “private” interchangeably to refer to what
the FAA has designated as “civil” aircraft—essentially, any aircraft not operated by a
public entity.
35

Villasenor, supra note 5, at 458. He’s right—I’ve been flying model airplanes for
twenty years myself.
36

Id. at 464. (“One key factor contributing to [UAV growth] is the continuing advance of

9
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Unmanned aircraft were deployed in the Vietnam War; unsuccessful
attempts date even farther back.37 Israel developed UAVs with real-time
surveillance capabilities in the 1970s and 80s. 38
[12] However, UAS’s military proliferation after the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001 (and the ongoing firestorm of media coverage that
resulted) cast the idea of “drones” in a decidedly negative light.39 As a
result, the discussion over integrating UAS into domestic airspace has
been dominated by skepticism. Add in recent revelations about the extent
of NSA surveillance and data collection—which grant legitimacy to
growing concerns about the state of our privacy protections—and it is a
very bad time to be a domestic drone.40
[13] This is particularly unfortunate because the vast majority of
domestic UAS applications, whether civil or private, are beneficial.
computing, imaging, and communications technologies.”).
37

Id. at 464.

38

Id.

39

Even my own experiences demonstrated a change in attitude. As a teenager I often
traveled to compete in model airplane competitions, and it was eerie to watch people’s—
particularly TSA agents’—attitudes towards my models change from interest to
skepticism. Toys became “drones,” and by the end of my career it took a letter from the
head pilot of United Airlines to get my model airplane overseas in one piece.
40

See, e.g., Wendie Kellington, Unmanned Air Systems and Regulating Navigable
Airspace, ALI ALBA LAND USE INST. 1 (Aug. 14–16 2013), available at
http://www.wkellington.com/pdf/2013/Unmanned-Aerial-Systems-and-RegulatingNavigable-Airspace.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G8FD-RLEY (“The military’s use of
UAVs in the hunt for al Qaeda operatives created an indelible public image of mindless
beasts carrying out a distant programmers’ messy bidding. Moreover, reports of UAVs
being developed for purposes like hiding from and sneaking up on people have not
generated an enthusiastic reception for domestic use of the technology. Civil demand for
domestic UAVs thus finds itself colliding with a culture of wariness, creating difficult
barriers to domestic UAV use and slowing regulatory response.”).
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Indeed, if these aircraft are as successful at home as they have (arguably)
been in their military applications, the market for new and varied models
has incredible potential. Unmanned flight can contribute to efficiency,
productivity, and safety in a potentially unlimited number of areas. 41
Farmers can use them to crop-dust safely. 42 Civil engineers can monitor
traffic and power lines. An enterprising farmer in Ireland, apparently, has
discovered that drones are wonderful at herding sheep.43 In the coming
decades, individuals may even receive pizzas and Internet service via
drone.44
[14] Nevertheless, integrating UAS into U.S. airspace raises a number
of concerns. The foremost of these relate to privacy and safety. What
follows is an overview of the frameworks that will govern the regulation
of UAS, as well as an overview of existing regulations themselves.
III. SOURCES OF REGULATION
A. Fourth Amendment: the Third-Party Doctrine
1. Precedent
[15]

The Fourth Amendment restricts government (not private actors),

41

Id. (“According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), current domestic use
of UAVs includes law enforcement, monitoring or fighting forest fires, border security,
weather research and scientific data collection by the federal government.”)
42

As of the writing of this article, Japan has successfully implemented UAVs towards
this purpose.
43

See Michael Franco, Watch This Drone Shepherd Round Up Its Flock on an Irish
Farm, CNET (Mar. 30, 2015, 11:52 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/watch-this-droneshepherd-round-up-a-flock-on-a-farm-in-ireland/, archived at http://perma.cc/7YUF4RRU.
44

See Hambling, supra note 11.
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so some might question its place in an article about commercial drones.
For this reason, and because others have discussed the subject in detail,45
what follows is a primer on a particular piece of Fourth Amendment law—
the “third-party” or “Miller” doctrine. The manner in which this doctrine
is applied to data collected by UAS will bear significantly on developing
policies regarding commercial drone use. Articulated in United States v.
Miller, this doctrine permits the government to obtain information from
third parties, in certain circumstances, without the procedural hurdles that
would otherwise present themselves if the information were sought
directly from a suspect.46
[16] In Miller, the trial court convicted the defendant of various federal
offenses involving his operation of an unlicensed whiskey still. 47 On
appeal, he argued that the trial court committed error in failing to suppress
records obtained from his two banks. 48 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed the conviction “on the ground that a depositor’s Fourth
Amendment rights are violated when bank records . . . are obtained by
means of a defective subpoena.”49 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,
and reversed again. 50
[17] In doing so, the Court rejected the argument that the defendant
retained an expectation of privacy in information relayed to the bank.51
45

See generally Villasenor, supra note 5 (discussing government operation of unmanned
aircraft and the Fourth Amendment).
46

See U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976).

47

See id. at 437.

48

See id. at 436.

49

Id. at 437.

50

Id. at 435.

51

Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
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Even though the bank was required by statute to maintain its records, and
the defendant was required to release the information in order to do
business with the bank, the Court cited prior holdings in concluding:
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him
to Government authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party
will not be betrayed. 52
[18] The third-party doctrine has since formed the basis for a variety of
notable Supreme Court opinions. In Smith v. Maryland, police—without a
warrant or court order—asked a telephone service provider to install a
“pen register” in its offices in order to track a suspect’s phone calls. 53 The
Court held, in a decision that has wielded significant influence since the
development of the Internet,54 that the defendant had “assumed the risk
that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”55 The
court noted that the register recorded only the numbers dialed—not the
content of the conversations, which presumably would have been entitled
to greater protection. 56
52

Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.

53

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).

54

See John P. Collins, Project, The Third Party Doctrine in the Digital Age, N.Y.L. SCH.
JUST. ACTION CTR. 6 (2012), available at http://www.nyls.edu/documents/justice-actioncenter/student_capstone_journal/cap12collins.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CXA7HLFN (“The significance of this decision was not readily apparent, but by expanding the
third party doctrine to include information revealed to a machine carrying out a routine
task, the court laid a foundation that would drastically expand the reach of the third party
doctrine upon the advent of the [I]nternet.”).
55

Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.

56

Id. at 741, 744.
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[19] Later, in California v. Greenwood, the Court extended its Smith
analysis to rule that the contents of a suspect’s garbage received no Fourth
Amendment protection. 57 The Court reiterated its observation that “a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties.” 58 Therefore, the Court held,
procuring the suspect’s trash from his garbage collector worked no
Constitutional harm. 59 The Court also stressed, however, that the
suspect’s transmission of information to the public in general deprived
him of a Fourth Amendment claim: “Hence, ‘what a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection.’” 60 The garbage bags in question were
accessible not only to the trash collector, but to “animals, children,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.”61
[20] The final Supreme Court case that deserves mention is United
States v. Jones.62 In Jones, the government procured a warrant to place a
GPS device on a suspect’s vehicle; the warrant provided that the device
should be secured within ten days in the District of Columbia. 63 Instead,
the device was attached to the suspect’s vehicle in Maryland and on the

57

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).

58

Id. at 41.

59

Id. at 40 (“respondents placed their refuse at the curb for the express purpose of
conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through
respondents' trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so.”).
60

Id. at 41 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).

61

Id. at 40.

62

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).

63

Id. at 948.
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eleventh day, voiding the warrant. 64 The government monitored the
vehicle’s position for twenty-eight days, and at one point changed the
battery in the device—also in Maryland.65 The Court unanimously held
that the month-long monitoring of the vehicle’s position, without a proper
warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment.66
[21] In Jones, the Court neither relied on nor repudiated the “thirdparty” doctrine. 67 The case nevertheless merits note because of the varied
perspectives articulated in not only the Court’s opinion, but also in certain
Justices’ concurrences. 68 Scalia wrote for the majority. 69 His opinion
highlighted the trespass that had occurred when law enforcement placed
the GPS device on the suspect’s automobile.70 It noted a turn in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that had occurred in the latter half of the
twentieth century, beginning with Katz (the source of a test that has
dominated more recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test). 71 Before that, the Court stated, Fourth
Amendment rights had turned on the more traditional law of trespass.72
[22]

In an originalist interpretation typical of Scalia’s Constitutional

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id. at 954–57.

67

See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.

68

See id. at 948–64.

69

Id. at 948.

70

Id. at 949.

71

Id. at 949–50.

72

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–50.
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readings, the Court held that Katz’s “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy”
test was not exclusive; rather, it complemented this more traditional,
trespassed-based line of Fourth Amendment law.73 The Court’s decision
rested on the fact that the government had “physically occupied private
property for the purpose of obtaining information.”74 Such an intrusion,
the Court reasoned, would “no doubt . . . have been considered a ‘search’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”75
The Court rejected the government’s principle argument (tied to Katz and
its progeny): that Jones held no reasonable expectation of privacy in (1)
the undercarriage of his car or (2) his movements on public roads.76 It
distinguished prior cases involving mere observation, with no
accompanying trespass. Despite its reliance on the government’s trespass
as the basis for its holding—and its distinguishing of similar cases without
that element—the majority did not address whether the extended
monitoring achieved here would have violated the Fourth Amendment if
no trespass had occurred. In fact, it explicitly avoided that question: “[i]t
may be that achieving the same result through electronic means, without
an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but
the present case does not require us to answer that question.”77
[23] Jones also generated two concurring opinions. Justice Alito,
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, would have held that
Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights to privacy were violated based solely on
Katz’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.78 They concluded four
73

Id. at 952.

74

Id. at 949.

75

Id.

76

Id. at 950–52.

77

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954.

78

Id. at 957–64.
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weeks of location monitoring contradicted reasonable expectations:
The best that we can do in this case is to apply existing
Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of
GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree of
intrusion that a reasonable person would not have
anticipated. Under this approach, relatively short-term
monitoring of a person's movements on public streets
accords with expectations of privacy that our society has
recognized as reasonable. But the use of longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on
expectations of privacy. 79
[24] Justice Sotomayor joined the majority in agreeing that a trespassbased approach functions as a baseline of constitutional protection, but she
wrote separately to address her own concerns with electronic monitoring.80
She agreed with Alito’s concurrence insofar as, under the Katz analysis,
the government’s long-term monitoring of Jones violated his expectation
of privacy. 81 She went further in suggesting that even certain types of
short-term electronic monitoring might violate the Fourth Amendment.82
Finally, she questioned the continuing validity of the third-party doctrine
in the digital age:
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves
79

Id. at 963–64 (internal citations omitted).

80

Id. at 954–57.

81

Id. at 955–56.

82

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–56.
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to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.
. . . I would not assume that all information voluntarily
disclosed to some member of the public for a limited
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth
Amendment protection. 83
2. Application of Third-party Doctrine to Information
Captured by Commercial Drones
[25] What can the foregoing cases teach us about information captured
by commercial drones? First, these aircraft—and the data they capture—
will not fall neatly into any particular line of Supreme Court precedent.
Miller’s original formula highlighted the “voluntary” nature of the
defendant’s disclosures to the bank, which were made for the purpose of
receiving services. 84 This relationship is not likely to exist in cases where
commercial UAS capture images of private citizens. Perhaps a “Facebook
drone” that provides Internet may keep records of Internet activity, but any
images it captures would be unrelated to the service provided. 85
Relatedly, in Smith, the Court was concerned not just with voluntary
disclosure to a third party, but also with the non-personal nature of the call
data.86 UAS are distinguishable on this basis as well.
[26] However, Greenwood identifies another factor in the Court’s Katz
analyses: whether the information in question was divulged to the public
83

Id. at 957 (internal citations omitted).

84

U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).

85

See generally Issie Lapowsky, Facebook Lays Out Its Roadmap For Creating InternetConnected Drones, WIRED (Sept. 23, 2014, 1:07 PM),
http://www.wired.com/2014/09/facebook-drones-2/, archived at http://perma.cc/C6LXLJNN (explaining Facebook’s plan for bringing Internet access to the world through
drones).
86

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–45 (1979).
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at large. 87 To be fair, that case also cited a “voluntary” disclosure of
information to a third party—the trash collector—in expectation of
services provided. 88 But it is not at all clear that the result rested on this
relationship. The Court appeared just as concerned with the fact that the
suspect’s garbage was accessible to curious members of the public. 89
While commercial or private drones could conceivably be used to retrieve
information a citizen sought to protect as secret—for instance, by
monitoring electronic transmissions—it seems people are far more
concerned with the images they might capture. In this, Greenwood is of
little help and would suggest that any images taken of an individual on
public roads would be subject to appropriation by law enforcement.90
[27] Finally, Jones suggests the Court is beginning to consider
rethinking the third party doctrine in the context of the digital age.
Sotomayor’s concurrence explicitly states this, 91 and five of the justices
would likely have found a Fourth Amendment violation based solely on
Katz’s “reasonable expectations” test.92 The Court’s narrow basis for its
holding, however, kept the third-party doctrine alive for the time being.
[28] Jones may indeed suggest that the Supreme Court is open to
breathing new life into the Fourth Amendment as technology continues to
permit cheaper, more pervasive surveillance. 93 And in the context of
digital information, at least one current Justice may be open to rethinking
87

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988).

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

See id.

91

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012).

92

Id. at 954–64.

93

Id. at 962–63.
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(or eliminating) the third-party doctrine. 94 Nevertheless, at the moment, it
appears that images legally collected by UAS would often be available for
government access—at least so long as the contents of those images
conveyed information revealed to the public. 95
[29] If that is the case, one can reasonably expect that the third-party
doctrine will influence regulatory approaches to commercial UAS at the
state and local level. For example: the ACLU (a staunch proponent of,
and lobbyist for, UAS regulation) is currently concerned largely with
restricting government surveillance.96 However, that may change—once
private UAS assimilate into our airspace 97 —if law enforcement begins
using the third-party doctrine as a loophole to retrieve data without
probable cause or a warrant.98 Granted, it may not be legal or profitable
94

Id. at 957.

95

See generally Carol Cratty, FBI Uses Drones for Surveillance in U.S., CNN (June 20,
2013, 7:27 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/19/politics/fbi-drones/, archived at
http://perma.cc/5J4T-99FF (stating that the FBI’s policy on retaining images from drones
is unclear).
96

See, e.g., Neema Singh Guliani, Unchecked Government Drones? Not over My
Backyard, ACLU (Mar. 24, 2015, 3:23 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakfreely/unchecked-government-drones-not-over-my-backyard?redirect=blog/technologyand-liberty/unchecked-government-drones-not-over-my-backyard, archived at
https://perma.cc/K698-AHKW?type=source.
97

Because public entities dominate the domestic UAS scene for the moment, it is
possible that the ACLU is simply focused on the more immediate issue. See id.
98

At least one writer on the ACLU website has made this connection in the context of
law enforcement use, condemning a North Dakota bill that would permit the use of
evidence incidentally collected during an authorized government drone flight. See Allie
Bohm, Drone Legislation: What’s Being Proposed in the States, ACLU (Mar. 6, 2013,
3:15 PM) https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/drone-legislation-whats-being-proposedstates, archived at https://perma.cc/UQ5X-XPMT?type=source [hereinafter Drone
Legislation: What’s Being Proposed in the States] (“[T]here are also bills that take the
low road: North Dakota’s bill explicitly allows incidentally collected information to be
introduced in court. So, if a drone on the way to fight a forest fire happens to record you
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for a private entity to track a particular subject’s every move. On the other
hand, one can easily imagine that a private drone collecting images in an
urban setting will happen to snap a photograph of a crime in progress.
Under many states’ existing schemes for UAS regulation, the government
would be required to ignore or destroy such an image if it originated from
a government drone—but not if it originated from a privately-operated
drone. 99 Privacy advocates that have so rigorously promoted a higher
standard for government surveillance will certainly want to eliminate this
discrepancy.
B. The First Amendment
[30] The Fourth Amendment will not be the Constitution’s only
contribution to the debate over commercial UAS. Courts have read into
the First Amendment a right—held not just by the press, but by private
citizens—to information gathering. 100 Because the Supreme Court has yet
to rule on the matter, however, the extent of behavior the First
Amendment might protect is not entirely clear.
[31] The most recent cases discussing this “right to record” have
centered largely on private citizens’ recording of police activity. 101 This is
engaged in private activities, the police would not be required to delete that information
and could actually use it in court against you, no warrant required—before or after the
fact. This could create some dangerous incentives.”).
99

See generally Rich Williams, 2014 State Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 16, 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2014-state-unmanned-aircraftsystems-uas-legislation.aspx, archived at https://perma.cc/ZL7X-QHV8?type=source
(summarizing the current state legislation regarding UAS).
100

See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of
Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
101

See, e.g., Glik, 655 F.3d at 83; Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333; Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d
155, 156 (11th Cir. 1995).
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not surprising; police secrecy and police misconduct stir negative
reactions from unease to revulsion. Moreover, the benefits of greater
transparency in this area—such as protecting citizens from abuse, and
holding police responsible for abusing their positions of power102—would
seem to far outweigh any detriments. 103 Accordingly, several Circuit
Courts of Appeal have held that private citizens have a First Amendment
right to record law enforcement activities.104
[32] One of the more recent of these decisions is Glik v. Cunniffe.105 In
that case, plaintiff Simon Glik brought a § 1983 claim alleging that his
First Amendment rights had been violated by his arresting officers. 106
Glik—happening on an arrest in progress—had begun filming the event
when it appeared that the police were harming the arrestee and was
subsequently arrested for violation of a wiretap statute. 107 The First
Circuit held in Glik’s favor, citing a slew of authority establishing his right
to record the officers’ actions. 108 Notably, the court also held that the right

102

In addition, the recordings themselves are competent evidence for trial. See FED. R.
EVID. 1001, 1002.
103

See, e.g., Steven A. Lautt, Note, Sunlight Is Still the Best Disinfectant: The Case for A
First Amendment Right to Record the Police, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 349, 355 (2012) (“As a
leading reason for their opposition to citizen-surveillance, police advocates have cited the
concern that officers will hesitate in life-threatening situations for fear of their actions
being caught on video. However, the more prevalent concern for police officers is the
risk video monitoring poses to the substantial deference courts give officers in their
official recounting of facts.”).
104

See, e.g., Glik, 655 F.3d at 83; Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333.

105

Glik, 655 F.3d at 83.

106

Id. at 79.

107

Id. at 79–80.

108

Id. at 82–89.
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was firmly established within its jurisdiction—as required by § 1983.109
Finally, it established in clear language that the First Amendment protects
not only the press’s right to record, but that of individuals, as well. The
court focused in particular on the location of the recording, noting that
“Glik filmed the defendant police officers in the Boston Common, the
oldest city park in the United States and the apotheosis of a public forum.
In such traditional public spaces, the rights of the state to limit the exercise
of First Amendment activity are ‘sharply circumscribed.’”110
[33] The Glik court clarified that the right to record, like any First
Amendment activity, is “subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions.”111 Although it declined to explore these further, its holding
is instructive in that it relies on Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n for the proposition that states’ ability to limit recording
is “sharply circumscribed” in public. 112 Perry, a 1983 Supreme Court
case, involved not recording but traditional speech activities. 113
[34] Other circuits are consistent with Glik in recognizing a right to
record police officers in public.114 Although the Glik court mentioned two
somewhat contrary decisions in the Third and Fourth circuits, these rested
on the “clearly established” portion of the § 1983 analysis, not on whether

109

Id. at 88.

110

Glik, 655 F.3d at 84 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
111

Id. at 84.

112

Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.

113

Id. at 38–40.

114

See, e.g., Bowens v. Superintendant of Miami South Beach Police Dep’t., 557 Fed.
Appx. 857, 863 (11th Cir. 2014); Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333; Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d
155, 156 (11th Cir. 1995).
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the constitutional right existed per se.115 Moreover, Kelly v. Borough of
Carlisle dealt with recording during a traffic stop—a situation the court
distinguished as inherently dangerous.116
[35] Thus, most or all courts are in agreement in acknowledging the
right to record police in public. Courts in most Circuits also agree that the
right to record extends to matters of public concern.117 However, there has
been less agreement (and less guidance in general) on other circumstances
in which the right to record will apply. 118
115

Glik, 655 F.3d at 85.

116

Id. Further, in 2014, the First Circuit clarified that the right to record in a traffic stop,
while not unqualified, is now “clearly established.” Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 9 (1st
Cir. 2014).
117

See Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333 (“The First Amendment protects the right to gather
information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to
record matters of public interest.”); see also Iacobucci v. Boulter, No. Civ. A. 94-10531PBS, 1997 WL 258494 at *6 (D. Mass, Mar. 26, 1997) (unpublished opinion) (finding
that an independent reporter has a protected right under the First Amendment and state
law to videotape public meetings); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir.
1995) (recognizing a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest”);
Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that plaintiffs’ interest
in filming public meetings is protected by the First Amendment); Williamson, 65 F.3d at
159 (11th Cir. 1995) (reversing district court’s grant of qualified immunity to a law
enforcement officer who seized the film of and arrested a participant in a demonstration
for photographing undercover officers); Thompson v. City of Clio, 765 F. Supp. 1066,
1070–72 (M.D. Ala. 1991) (finding that city council’s ban on member's attempt to record
proceedings regulated conduct protected by the First Amendment); Lambert v. Polk
County, 723 F. Supp. 128, 133 (S.D. Iowa 1989) (“[I]t is not just news organizations . . .
who have First Amendment rights to make and display videotapes of events....”); United
States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding that the press generally
has no right to information superior to that of the general public) (citing Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978)).
118

See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things
They Carry, 4. CAL. L. REV. CIR. 57, 63–64 (2013) (questioning whether the First
Amendment right will apply with drone photography).
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[36] How, then, will courts analyze the First Amendment rights of UAV
operators? Glik appears to indicate that some existing precedent on “time,
place, and manner” restrictions will enter into the analysis: the right to
speak is at its strongest in public places, and so is the right to record.119
However, other First Amendment principles are less susceptible to such a
simple analogy. For example, an early step in First Amendment analyses
is to determine the type of speech. This question is difficult to answer in
the UAV context—taking a picture is taking a picture.120 Similarly, true
speech can be regulated in areas in which there probably remains a
constitutional protection for information gathering. The Supreme Court
has held it constitutionally permissible to restrict speech at airports,121 but
it would make little sense to prohibit photography in a place (1) with
significant law enforcement presence, and (2) in which patrons have very
little expectation of privacy. Precedent will not always be as useful as the
court in Glik found it to be. Therefore, there is yet little guidance on what
types of time, place, and manner restrictions will be constitutional in the
UAV context.
[37] Ultimately, the extent of constitutional protections for UAV
operators will boil down to a weighing of privacy against expression.122
Seth Kreimer has identified one relevant principle of First Amendment
law that might guide such an analysis:

119

Glik, 655 F.3d at 84.

120

One might examine the purposes of collecting an image: are they artistic?
Journalistic? Scientific? That approach could work in limited circumstances—for
example, vulgar purposes could constitutionally be proscribed.
121

See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness of Cal., Inc. v. City of L.A., 48 Cal. 4th
446, 460 (2010).
122

See Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory,
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 392–93 (2011).
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[R]egulation must follow established legal rules that
authoritatively recognize the scope of the privacy interest at
stake and tailor the response to meet concerns of
constitutional magnitude. Catchall statutes . . . do not meet
this requirement. Nor do claims of street-level bureaucrats
who maintain a right to discharge their duties in public
without being recorded, nor those of private parties who
seek to remove from the public domain images they have
revealed to the public gaze. . . .
Once we recognize that image capture is protected by
principles of free expression, proposals to impose liability
without observing the established limitations of privacy
torts—either by common law innovation or by statute—
raise serious constitutional questions.123
If Kreimer’s observations are correct, lawmakers passing “drone”
legislation may be faced with an ironic result: their laws may violate the
First Amendment unless they more or less align with the existing legal
systems they deemed inadequate. 124 Laws that restrict UAS capturing
images of private property, for example, could fail (1) because of
overbreadth and (2) because they fail to conform to established
expectations of privacy.
[38] One more facet of First Amendment doctrine that deserves note is
a preference for narrow holdings that will probably apply in circumstances
involving UAS. In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this
approach: “[w]e continue to believe that the sensitivity and significance of
the interests presented in clashes between [the] First Amendment and
privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more
123

Id. at 393, 398.

124

Id. at 389–91.
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broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case.”125
[39] This preference could have a particularly deleterious effect on a
burgeoning UAS industry. State laws that broadly violate the First
Amendment, rather than being tested on their faces in the courts, could
instead survive for years (with minor erosions). In the meantime,
commercial drone users will surely avoid investing in “illegal” activities
that may or may not be constitutionally protected—and insurers will avoid
insuring them.
[40] It may seem odd to some that the right to take a picture would be
protected by the First Amendment—after all, it is conduct with little
content. But there are strong arguments for such a protection. People
often take pictures in anticipation of disseminating them later. 126 And
even if that is not the photographer’s intention, she should not be deemed
universally unworthy of First Amendment protections. The Court has
stated free speech includes the freedom not to speak at all, and even
“communications of one” inform later acts of speech. 127
[41] UAS will be used to exercise freedom of speech in numerous—and
worthwhile—ways. One obvious example is by the media: drones will
soon be capable of performing every function a news helicopter can, and
125

Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001) (quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S.
524, 532–33 (1989)).
126

Kreimer, supra note 122, at 381 (“One might try to dissect the medium into its
component acts of image acquisition, recording, and dissemination and conclude that
recording is an unprotected ‘act’ without an audience. But this maneuver is as
inappropriate as maintaining that the purchase of stationery or the application of ink to
paper are ‘acts’ and therefore outside of the aegis of the First Amendment.”).
127

Id. at 378–79 (“Diaries of words or images need not communicate with outsiders to
merit constitutional protection under the First Amendment. . . . Speech is protected not
simply as a way of communicating with others, but as a means of defining the speaker's
thoughts, intellect, and memories.”).
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more. But there will be other UAS uses tied highly to freedoms of
expression, including some that we may not anticipate. One example is
“drone art”—artwork created from images taken by UAVs. 128 NBC News
sponsored the first “New York City Drone Film Festival” in March of this
year. 129 People from landscape artists to Hollywood film producers will
want to incorporate these aircraft in their media of expression.
[42] In the meantime, states’ drone policies have already begun to
violate First Amendment rights. The Texas Privacy Act may, in fact, have
been designed to do just that: the law was proposed after a drone hobbyist
discovered a slaughterhouse polluting a river with pig’s blood.130 In this
sense, the Act (and others like it) could be construed as an effort to protect
businesses’ privacy from individuals under the guise of doing the reverse.
Although the law may be struck down if challenged and although it creates
exemptions for certain test sites,131 Texas has proven that states may not
be the most conscientious laboratories for developing drone legislation.

128

The Art of Drone Painting, Center for the Study of the Drone, Bard College (Dec. 6,
2014), http://dronecenter.bard.edu/art-of-drone-painting/, archived at
http://perma.cc/XS8S-A3FG.
129

Organized for the first time in 2014, the festival was started by an enthusiast “with a
desire to change the perceptions of drones.” New York City Drone Film Festival, NBC
NEWS, http://nycdronefilmfestival.com/, archived at http://perma.cc/YQ7L-PWKX (last
visited Apr. 11, 2015); New York Drone Film Festival Is Meant to ‘Fight Stigma,’
Creator Says, NBC NEWS (Mar. 5, 2015, 12:30 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/nyc-drone-film-festival/nyc-drone-film-festivaln318121, archived at http://perma.cc/DST3-BPRY.
130

Laura Patty, The Sky Is the Limit: Regulating The Next Generation of Privacy
Invasion, GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. (2013), available at
http://ggulawreview.org/2013/11/29/the-sky-is-the-limit-regulating-the-next-generationof-privacy-invasion-2/, archived at http://perma.cc/JG26-HSBV (“Don’t mess with the
meatpacking lobby in Texas.”).
131

Tex. Gov’t Code § 423.002 (2013).
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C. Existing Privacy Protections
[43] Of course, a large number of existing state laws will also apply to
the domestic use of drones. Flying UAVs at a low and/or unsafe altitude
over private property could violate trespass laws. 132 Use a drone for
snooping, and you could face liability under intrusion upon seclusion,
stalking, harassment, or nuisance theories. 133 Distribute the images you
obtained, and the list of laws you may have broken grows to include
“public disclosure of private facts.” 134
Intercepting data or
communications could conceivably violate wiretap statutes. 135 Some
privacy frameworks may require rewording to explicitly cover UAS;
others will suffice as written.136
[44] Scholars have written in detail about the interaction between
existing laws and UAS activity; for example, John Villasenor has
published an article including an extensive and unbiased survey. 137
However, the existing framework of privacy protections will have little
impact on the advent of commercial UAVs. UAVs used for benign
information gathering will represent the vast majority of the commercial
market,138 and will not run afoul of existing privacy laws—provided that
they remain within their permitted airspace. This Article therefore
132

See Villasenor, supra note 5, at 499.

133

Id. at 500–01.

134

Id.

135

Id. at 498.

136

See id. at 499–500 (Arizona trespass statute likely applies to UAVs, whereas Oregon’s
and California’s may not).
137

See Villasenor, supra note 5, at 498–508. Readers who are interested in this topic are
encouraged to consult John Villasenor’s work.
138

See Doering, supra note 26.
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foregoes further coverage of the subject.
D. Proposed and Enacted “Drone Laws” at the State and
Local Level
[45] In 2013, forty-three states proposed bills specifically regulating
UAVs. 139 In 2014, that number grew and many of the bills were
enacted.140 As of the writing of this article, legislation has been passed in
more than twenty of those states.141
[46] Most states’ primary concern has been regulating law enforcement
use of UAVs. Accordingly, most of the proposed bills in 2013—for
example—would require a warrant for law enforcement to use a drone for
surveillance of a suspect, subject to certain exceptions, including
emergency situations. 142 A number of different approaches have
emerged—for instance, legislation passed in Georgia permits surveillance
only to investigate felonies, not misdemeanors.143 Virginia has passed a
two-year moratorium on all law enforcement use of UAVs. 144 A Nebraska
bill prohibits law enforcement use—with or without a warrant—except in
terrorism investigations. 145
139

See Status of 2014 Domestic Drone Legislation, supra note 18.

140

See 2014 State Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Legislation, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEGIS. (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2014state-unmanned-aircraft-systems-uas-legislation.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/6KEE7T3F.
141

See, e.g., Williams, supra note 16.

142

See Drone Legislation: What’s Being Proposed in the States?, supra note 98
(surveying 2013 drone legislation).
143

S.B. 200, 2013-14 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013).

144

H.B. 2012, 2013 Sess. (Va. 2013).
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[47] However, a number of states have already begun to consider
private and commercial restrictions. A proposed bill in Missouri would
ban using a drone to conduct video surveillance on any individual, or over
private property, without consent. 146 In Washington, the House passed
Bill 2178, which similarly prohibits persons from flying UAVs over
private property without consent; 147 the Bill stalled in the Senate, but
several of its policies were incorporated into another bill that was
passed. 148 Wisconsin has approved a bill that would make it a
misdemeanor to photograph, record, or otherwise observe an individual in
any location in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 149 A recent California bill would make it a trespass to fly a drone,
without consent, over private property and “below the navigable
airspace.”150 The Texas Privacy Act creates two separate misdemeanors:
(1) non-consensual UAV imaging of private property, and (2) possessing
or distributing an image so obtained. 151 And these are only some
examples of legislation targeted at private or commercial UAS.
[48]

Localities have also begun to restrict UAV flight, with much more

145

L.B. 412, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013).

146

H.B. 46, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012).

147

H.B. 2178, 63d Leg., 2014 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014).

148

Ashley Stewart, Bill Limiting Drone Use Passes House, Senate, THE SEATTLE TIMES
(Mar. 10, 2014, 4:54 PM),
http://blogs.seattletimes.com/politicsnorthwest/2014/03/10/bill-limiting-drone-usepasses-house-sentate/, archived at http://perma.cc/B95J-7MQ2.
149

S.B. 196, 2013-2014 Leg. (Wis. 2013).

150

S.B. 142, 2014-2015 Leg. (Cal. 2015).

151

See 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3691–94. In addition, the Act’s definition of “image”
includes sound and other forms of data. See id. at 3691.
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peculiar results. Both St. Bonaficius, Minnesota and Evanston, Illinois
have banned UAV flight within city limits. 152 Evanston’s resolution
exempts hobbyists from the ban, but St. Bonaficius’s does not. 153 Of
course, the most alarming solution proposed at the local level arises in
Deer Trail, Colorado—the town that considered issuing “drone hunting”
licenses. 154
[49] So far, attempts to address commercial UAS at the state and local
level have probably overreached at times. First, some likely run afoul of
the First Amendment. Even if that is not the case, they fail to reflect a
reasonable balance between privacy protections and the economic and
social benefits of UAS.
[50] All the above examples have the potential, in their overreaching, to
restrict the growth of the UAS industry, for several reasons. The first is
simply that outlawing a technology, by definition, eliminates buyers from
its market. But there’s more to it. UAVs, by nature, will roam. They may
pass through the airspace over multiple cities, or even multiple states.
They may retrieve images of other jurisdictions without actually crossing
overhead. 155 Operators will have to be aware of every law they might
bump against; if those laws are unclear or too varied, they will be unable
to calculate potential liability, and far less likely to invest in purchasing a
drone.156
152

See David Swanson, All Drone Politics Is Local, WAR IS A CRIME .ORG (Nov. 14,
2013), http://warisacrime.org/content/all-drone-politics-local, archived at
http://perma.cc/FEW4-E8CY.
153

See id.

154

See Ryan Grenoble, Done Hunting in Deer Trail, Colorado? Town Considers Bounty
for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 17, 2013, 4:02 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/17/drone-hunting-deer-trailcolorado_n_3611806.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6ZE2-P4WP.
155

See Villasenor, supra note 5, at 515.
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[51] Operators will also want insurance from legal liability for their
UAV operations. This could wind up being very expensive, and not just
because uncertainty in the law will raise costs. Insurers are nothing if not
cognizant of risk. The potential liability exposure of operating a UAV in
some of the jurisdictions listed above would be massive. A commercial
drone hovering in a single location could conceivably capture images of
hundreds of individuals’ private property. Neither an operator nor an
insurer would want to take that risk in, say, Texas or Wisconsin.
E. Federal Sources of Regulation—The FAA
[52] The Federal Aviation Administration, or “FAA,” is an arm of the
Department of Transportation (“DOT”).157 Its primary mission is aviation
safety. 158 The current organization has its origins in a 1958 act of
156

For one person’s anecdote on how regulations disappoint potential customers and
spoil UAS deals, see Mike Francis, Drone Company Says Ambiguity in Federal
Regulations Keeps Customers on Sidelines, OREGONLIVE (Apr. 3, 2014, 10:24 AM),
http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2014/04/drone_company_says_ambiguity
_i.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3EFG-FQPQ (“Stephen Burtt, the cofounder and
CEO of Aerial Technology International, says his Clackamas-based company has
answered many inquiries about its unmanned aerial systems—drones—from potential
corporate customers. . . . [T]he conversations have been promising, with customers
seeing the value of buying one of the company's drones to carry out tasks that currently
require pilots or other workers. But then the corporate legal department gets involved.
And the potential sale stalls. ‘There's an incredible level of frustration’ about the state of
federal regulation of unmanned vehicles, he said. The slow rollout of regulations in this
country means ‘the rest of the world has much more developed markets’ for the use of
drones.”).
157

See Our Administrations, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., http://www.dot.gov/administrations,
archived at http://perma.cc/DD5W-Z5DF (last updated Mar. 10, 2015).
158

See Mission, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/about/mission/, archived at
http://perma.cc/B6DZ-KBPD (last modified Apr. 23, 2010, 9:37:40 AM) (“Our
continuing mission is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the
world.”).
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Congress creating a “Federal Aviation Agency”; the name change
occurred in 1966, when the agency was incorporated into a newly-formed
DOT.159
[53] The FAA’s earliest predecessor entity was the Aeronautics Branch
of the Department of Commerce, which was formed with the passing of
the Air Commerce Act of 1926.160 Before that time, the aviation industry
had been stunted by the uncertainty of myriad state statutory and common
law approaches. 161 Congress based its authority for regulating aviation on
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.162
[54] Those problems were remedied, and manned aircraft now enjoy a
set of regulations, promulgated by the FAA, that is uniform throughout the
United States. Consistent with its mission of fostering safety in the
national airspace, the FAA promulgates generally-applicable rules
regarding the design, maintenance, and operation of aircraft.163 Because
these rules were created with manned flight in mind, however, many of
them do not or cannot apply to unmanned aircraft.164 UAS have thrown a
159

See History, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/,
archived at http://perma.cc/XR3W-WGL8 (last modified Feb. 19, 2015, 4:23:26 PM).
160

See id.

161

See id.

162

See Timothy T. Takahashi, Drones in the National Airspace, 77 J. AIR L. & COM. 489,
518 (2012).
163

See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING THE CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS OF
CIVIL AIRCRAFT: A STRATEGY FOR THE FAA’S AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION SERVICE 12
(National Academy Press 1998).
164

See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg.
9544, 9549 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45, 47, 61,
91, 101, 107, 183).
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wrench in the FAA’s regulatory scheme—for example, lacking a cockpit,
they cannot conform with the mechanical standards for cockpit doors.
[55] The FAA also classifies airspace according to a number of factors,
including altitude ranges and proximity to airports.165 Aircraft are subject
to varying requirements depending on the airspace classes in which they
operate.166
[56] The FAA has provided some guidance with respect to UAV
operations. Direct line-of-sight to the aircraft is required at all times.167
Drones may only be operated with a Certificate of Waiver or
Authorization (hereinafter “COA”) from the FAA, or through a Special
Airworthiness Certificate-Experimental Category (hereinafter “SACEC”). 168 COAs have been available for a number of years to public
entities—such as law enforcement—that wish to operate a drone.169 Only
165

See Takahashi, supra note 162, at 507–09.

166

See id. at 507.

167

See Villasenor, supra note 5, at 472–73 (“Under the new law, public UAS operators
have had access to expedited COAs since May 14, 2012. UAS under these authorizations
must weigh no more than twenty-five pounds and be operated within the line of sight of
the operator, less than 400 feet above the ground, and during daylight conditions.”).
168

See Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Frequently Asked Questions, FED. AVIATION
ADMIN, https://www.faa.gov/uas/faq/, archived at https://perma.cc/89JY-WUFC (last
modified Mar. 17, 2015, 11:02:52 AM).
169

See Fact Sheet—Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), FED. AVIATION ADMIN (Jan. 6,
2014), https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=14153, archived
at https://perma.cc/VAA8-WBK2. For more detail on the process by which public
entities receive authorization to operate UAVs, and on authorizations that have been
granted, see Benjamin Kapnik, Unmanned but Accelerating: Navigating the Regulatory
and Privacy Challenges of Introducing Unmanned Aircraft into the National Airspace
System, 77 J. AIR L. & COM. 439, 445–46 (2012) (“To qualify for a certificate, the
applicant must show the aircraft's response to losing communication with its operator,
protocol if communication cannot be recovered, and that the unmanned aircraft can be
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recently, though, did the FAA offer a blanket COA to private operators for
which it had granted an “exemption.” Before that, non-government UAS
were authorized for experimental purposes only through the SAC-EC
process.170 The FAA has been sparing in granting exemptions to private
or commercial operators. 171 As of April 21, 2015, it had granted only
contained within a proposed flight area. The applicant must provide documentation of:
(1) the proposed operating area; (2) the manuals and checklists associated with the
aircraft, including those for normal and emergency procedures; (3) training for relevant
personnel; (4) evidence of completion of pilot licenses or other necessary certification;
and (5) proof that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has approved the
frequency of spectrum used to communicate with the aircraft. The typical COA is valid
for two years. Although the FAA initially refused to divulge information about the COA
applications and awards, in response to a lawsuit by the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
the agency released a list of sixty-one entities that had sought licenses to operate
unmanned aircraft in April 2012. Of those entities, only four applicants were
disapproved, and forty-one of the licenses remained active. Entities with active licenses
include universities, federal agencies, local police departments, and branches of the
military.”).
170

See Unmanned Aircraft (UAS) Certifications and Authorizations, FED. AVIATION
ADMIN, http://www.faa.gov/uas/certifications_authorizations/, archived at
http://perma.cc/AW5R-37KG (last modified Dec. 27, 2013, 4:03:43 PM) (“For civil
operation, applicants may obtain a Special Airworthiness Certificate, Experimental
Category by demonstrating that their unmanned aircraft system can operate safely within
an assigned flight test area and cause no harm to the public. Applicants must be able to
describe how their system is designed, constructed and manufactured; including
engineering processes, software development and control, configuration management,
and quality assurance procedures used, along with how and where they intend to fly. If
the FAA determines the project does not present an unreasonable safety risk, the local
FAA Manufacturing Inspection District Office will issue a Special Airworthiness
Certificate in the Experimental Category with operating limitations applicable to the
particular UAS.”).
171

See Kellington, supra note 38, at 39–40 (“Even under FMRA’s directive, FAA will
only issue COAs for UAVs to public organizations. Commercial operators who wish to
test or use UAVs must either find a public organizational sponsor that will accept
complete responsibility for the craft and for compliance with the terms of a COA or
obtain an experimental certificate. . . . FAA has issued only a handful of experimental
certificates for very limited flight tests, demonstrations, and training. FAA states on its
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207.172
[57] Until recently, a debate was quietly brewing over whether the FAA
had the authority to regulate small UAVs. One judge had categorized a
small UAV as a “model aircraft” and outside the FAA’s purview.173 Prior
to this case, the FAA had requested that modelers adhere to certain
guidelines, but it had not attempted to regulate models specifically. 174
Rather, the Academy of Model Aeronautics (hereinafter “AMA”)—a
national group of modeling enthusiasts—established standards for model
aircraft flying.175 The AMA generally requires that its members purchase
liability insurance and comply with the FAA’s recommendations. 176
[58] Consistent with this scheme, Congress—in its 2012 “FAA
Modernization and Reform Act” (hereinafter “FMRA”)—exempted model
website that it will not issue experimental certificates for UAVs except in very limited
circumstances”).
172

See Section 333, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
http://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/section_333/, archived at
http://perma.cc/HRE4-HLT7.
173

See Decisional Order at 7–8, Huerta v. Pirker, Docket No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. Mar. 6,
2014), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/Documents/Pirker-CP-217.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/YK59-EQDB.
174

See R.J. VAN VUREN, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR: MODEL
AIRCRAFT OPERATING STANDARDS (1981), available at
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/91-57.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/AQB7-J3MT.
175

See ACAD. OF MODEL AERONAUTICS, NATIONAL MODEL AIRCRAFT SAFETY CODE
(2014), available at http://www.modelaircraft.org/files/105.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/4WT8-A9DP.
176

See Benefits of this Association, ACAD. OF MODEL AERONAUTICS,
http://www.modelaircraft.org/membership/membership/overview.aspx, archived at
http://perma.cc/JHA2-CPZ4 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
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aircraft from future regulation by the FAA, provided the models meet
certain criteria. 177
[59] Recently the FAA began asserting that its Federal Aviation
Regulations (hereinafter “FARs”)—which govern the operation of
“aircraft”—also apply to model aircraft. 178 This led to a case that
ultimately confirmed (for now) the scope of the FAA’s control over all
forms of UAS. 179 In Huerta v. Pirker, the FAA sought to fine a paid drone
operator for allegedly unsafe operations. 180 At first, an administrative law
judge determined that the UAS was a “model aircraft” and not within the
FAA’s regulatory purview. 181 If that interpretation had prevailed, it would
have opened up the sky to small commercial drones. That case, however,
was reversed on appeal to the National Transportation Safety Board.182
The Board held that models are “aircraft,” too—and that the FAA’s safety
regulations applied to UAS (whether drone or model) with equal force. 183
177

FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95 § 336(a), 126 Stat.
11, 77 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
178

See Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,172, 36,172
(June 25, 2014) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91). The FARs broadly define “aircraft”
as “a device that is used for intended to be used for flight in the air.” 14 C.F.R. § 1.1
(2014).
179

See Opinion and Order at 12, Huerta v. Pirker, Docket No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. Nov. 17,
2014) [hereinafter Pirker Opinion and Order], available at
http://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/Documents/5730.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9EUNVZ9D.
180

See id. at 1–2; see also 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2014) (stating “[n]o person may operate an
aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of
another.”).
181

See id. at 3.

182

See id. at 2, 12.

183

See id. at 12.
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[60] In June 2014, before Pirker was reversed on appeal, the FAA
released a notice entitled “Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model
Aircraft.”184 The FAA’s position is consistent with the ultimate result in
Pirker: it contends that model aircraft (and all UAS or drones) fall within
the statutory definition of “aircraft” and thus are generally subject to at
least some existing FAA regulations.185
[61] Thus, existing case law (supported by the FAA’s stance) suggests
that, whether or not a UAV is a “model” aircraft, it will be subject to
certain existing FAA regulations. And, going forward, UAVs will only be
“models” exempt from future, targeted regulation if they are flown for
recreational purposes.186 UAS that are used commercially would not meet
that definition.187 The FAA has clearly established its intent to regulate
commercial UAS, whatever their size.
[62] One final lens for assessing the framework of developing drone
regulation comes again from the FAA. In November 2013 the FAA
released its “Roadmap for Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft
Systems in the National Airspace.” 188 The primary purpose of the
Roadmap was to “align proposed FAA actions with Congressional
mandates.”189
184

See Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft, 79 Fed. Reg. at 36,172.

185

See id. at 36,173.

186

See id. at 36,173–74.

187

See id. at 36,174.

188

See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., INTEGRATION OF CIVIL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEMS (NAS) ROADMAP i (1st ed. 2013) [hereinafter
ROADMAP], available at http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/uas_roadmap_2013.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/4XB3-F3HR.
189

Id. at i.
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[63] The FAA’s Roadmap did little from a practical perspective other
than arrange six mandated test-sites for UAS research and operation. 190
The remainder of the document discussed the unique safety concerns
posed by UAVs’ presence in our crowed national airspace.191 Principal
among these is the need to develop “sense and avoid” technologies. 192
However, the Roadmap did propose an instructive timeline for integrating
drones. The timeline is quite conservative: the FAA plans to continue
accommodating UAVs on a case-by-case basis. 193 The following two
steps—“integration” and “evolution”—are also expected to take about five
years each.194
[64] Although (as discussed infra) the FAA has since taken steps to
integrate small UAS into the national airspace, its Roadmap—which
presumably still applies to larger drones—has faced criticism. The
Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (“AVUSI”) sent
a letter to the FAA, noting “AUVSI’s economic impact study found that,
in the first decade following integration, the UAS industry will create
more than 100,000 jobs and $82 billion in economic impact. However,
each day that integration is delayed will lead to $27 million in lost
economic impact.”195
190

See id. at 37.

191

See id. at 12.

192

See id. at 28.

193

See ROADMAP, supra note 188, at 21–22. Notably, however—if the FAA’s
proposed rules for small UAS are adopted—the case-by-case inquiry will apply only to
larger drones.
194

See id. at 6, 21.

195

Letter from Michael Toscano, President & CEO, Ass’n for Unmanned Vehicle Sys.
Int’l, to Michael Huerta, Administrator, Fed. Aviation Admin. (Jan. 27, 2014), available
at http://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/AUVSI/f28f661a-e248-4687-b21d-
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[65] It is difficult to tell what effect the FAA’s conservative timeline
might have on developing state regulations of civil UAS. A longer, slower
process might eliminate some of the urgency to legislate. On the other
hand, states will apparently have abundant time to do so—and without
drones in our skies, it’s unlikely that people will warm up to their benefits.
[66] There is one area in which the FAA has taken reasonable
preliminary steps towards integration: small UAS. On February 15, 2015,
the FAA proposed a framework of regulations governing small UAS.196
The regulations have not yet taken effect; rather, the FAA has solicited
public commentary through April 24, 2015. 197 However, the proposed
rules would exempt UAS meeting certain qualifications from the FAA’s
case-by-case approval system. 198 Under the FAA’s proposed rules, UAS
that weigh less than fifty-five pounds could be flown by licensed
“operators” during daylight hours at altitudes less than 500 feet.199 While
line-of-sight operation would still be required under the proposed
regulations, this is a significant step forward for the commercial use of
small UAS in the United States. Unfortunately, in certain states that have
passed privacy laws restricting private UAS use, the FAA’s action may
mean little: even if aircraft meet the federal safety standards, it will be
virtually impossible to fly them lawfully where unauthorized photography
34342433abdb/UploadedFiles/1%2027%2014%20Letter%20on%20sUAS%20NPRM%2
0Delay.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/R8YP-6HQV.
196

See Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., DOT and FAA Propose New Rules for
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Feb. 15, 2015), available at
http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=18295, archived at
http://perma.cc/9SZ3-C4MB.
197

See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. at
9544.
198

See id. at 9579.

199

See id. at 9576.
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by UAS is prohibited.
[67] Much as states have, Congress has largely concerned itself with
protections against law enforcement invasions of privacy. 200 One
recurring bill, however, has included civil aircraft within its orbit. The
“Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015” would, among
other things, require any UAS seeking authorization to provide a “data
collection statement” indicating the focus and purpose of its imagegathering. 201 It would also instruct the Secretary of Transportation to
conduct a UAS privacy study and prepare a report.202 While transparency
in UAS operations might assuage privacy concerns, the administrative
costs of such a nationwide program are unclear. The Act also creates a
private right of action, which includes an attorney’s fee provision and
could have significant economic impact.203
IV. HOW SHOULD LEGISLATURES ADDRESS PRIVACY?
[68] In the broadest sense, there are three possible approaches to
dealing with the privacy concerns that drones raise: (1) wait and see, (2)
adopt a federalist system of regulation, or (3) enact a federal statute.204
Each of these systems has its merits. Below, the arguments for and
against the three regulatory schemes are outlined. It is ultimately
suggested that the best course of action would be to adopt a carefully
constructed federal privacy act governing drones. Such an act might
200

See, e.g., Preserving Freedom from Unwanted Surveillance Act of 2013, H.R. 972,
113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
201

Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015, S. 635, 114th Cong. (1st Sess.
2015).
202

See id. at § 337(a), (b).

203

See id. at § 4(d).

204

Of course, combinations of these are always an option as well.
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commission a study, or perhaps propose a baseline of privacy protections,
while also ensuring that states cannot legislate so as to create a de facto
ban on UAS over private property.205
A. The Case for Inaction
[69] The case for waiting on UAV legislation appears to be the least
favorite among academics,206 although it pops up from time to time in the
news. Its arguments are not without merit. The UAV industry is in its
infancy. It is impossible to predict all of its privacy implications, and
therefore enormously difficult to draft conscientious laws that strike the
proper balance between privacy and progress. 207 Smartphones have
already given us a society with ubiquitous, ambulatory cameras, doing
more to promote civil “surveillance” than drones are likely to do for some
years to come. They convey various kinds of personal data to third
parties, rendering it accessible by the government to search or introduce at
trial. Yet few would argue we should outlaw cell phones in the name of
privacy. The legislation that states have proposed so far has been
similarly overbroad, prohibiting far more activity than required to protect
privacy interests.
205

Congress would have to be particularly mindful that any privacy protections do not
restrict industry growth; the goal would be to assuage the concerns that have led states to
impose harsher restrictions.
206

One reason for this, I expect, may simply be the fact that an article prophesying
impending doom is more attractive to publishers than an article suggesting that
everything is probably fine.
207

See Villasenor, supra note 5, at 461 (“[W]hen drafting new laws it is critical to adopt a
balanced approach that recognizes the inherent difficulty of predicting the future of any
rapidly changing technology. In the early days of the Internet and mobile phones, it
would have been nearly impossible to accurately foresee all of the uses—both positive
and otherwise—to which these technologies have been applied. It is similarly difficult
today to predict exactly how UAS will be used—or even what they will look like—in the
coming decades. Although unmanned aircraft pose real and increasingly well recognized
privacy concerns, they also offer real and much less widely appreciated benefits.”).
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[70] Moreover, existing laws already provide a framework for
restricting many improper invasions of privacy by UAS.208 It would be
more reasonable, and less likely to violate the First Amendment right to
record, if states focused on adjusting existing laws to cover UAS. This
way, states would limit only as much UAS activity as necessary to
conform to existing privacy expectations. 209
[71] Perhaps the most conclusive argument against the “wait and see”
option is simply that the ship may have already sailed. At least forty-three
states have proposed drone bills, and laws are on the books in at least
twenty of them. There might still be hope that states will be more open to
commercial applications, as only a quarter or so of states have specifically
addressed private use.210 It seems likely, however, that more states will
take up that cause as it becomes more pressing. 211 For example, many
states that addressed only public surveillance forbade the government
from storing information collected inadvertently, or from using in court
information about anyone other than the subject of the warrant. 212
Presumably those states will want to consider drafting similar restrictions
for information collected by third-party UAVs.
[72]
208

Another potential problem with such an approach is that, in all

See, e.g., id. at 498.

209

However, this approach—despite reflecting a more reasonable balancing of interests—
would not make the legal system any less varied or unpredictable. There are variations
between states’ existing privacy laws, and there will be variations between the courts’
applications of those laws to UAVs. A uniform system would provide better notice of the
standard to everyone, and would better enable development.
210

See supra Part III.D.

211

See supra Part III.D.

212

See Drone Legislation: What’s Being Proposed in the States?, supra note 98
(Massachusetts and Rhode Island are two examples).
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likelihood, it will be very difficult to enforce existing privacy laws against
improper actors without at least some drone-specific rules on the books.
UAVs can be light, quiet, and virtually unnoticeable. They can observe
from angles one normally would not expect, and see over walls and on
rooftops. People who are illegally observed by UAS—for example, in
violation of a “Peeping Tom” statute—may never know their rights have
been violated, unless government imposes some restrictions. 213
B. Drone Federalism
[73] There are also several arguments in favor of leaving commercial
drone regulation largely in the hands of the states. The technology is new,
and state experimentation might lead to a better result than a federal
213

On the other hand, UAS-specific regulations could be just as difficult to enforce
against private individuals as current privacy laws, conveying no benefit while also
having a deleterious effect on legitimate business uses for UAVs. Companies that have
gone to the expense of hiring a trained and licensed drone “operator” will presumably
avoid actions that could subject them to civil or criminal liability. See, e.g., Gregory S.
McNeal, FAA Has Commercial Drone Regulation Backwards, FORBES (July 1, 2014,
4:32 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2014/07/01/faa-struggling-todeal-with-drones-now-going-after-realtors-and-farmers/, archived at
http://perma.cc/7YED-GBW7 (“When a realtor or farmer uses a piece of equipment for
commercial purposes their livelihood and businesses are on the line, [creating] clear
incentives for safe operation (not to mention big insurance policies). They aren’t going
to fly irresponsibly and push the limits of their equipment because they are working with
a clear purpose in mind.”). On the other hand, it will be difficult to regulate the behavior
of an average individual who bought a drone at the hobby store. Consider the recent
White House incident, in which a drunken government worker accidentally breached
some of the most heavily regulated airspace in the country. See Michael D. Shear &
Michael S. Schmidt, White House Drone Crash Described as a U.S. Worker’s Drunken
Lark, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2015, at A15, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/us/white-house-drone.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/L6DA-XCJ5; Charlotte McCoy, AMA Reacts to President Obama: More
Regulation Wouldn’t Have Prevented White House “Drone” Incident, AMA GOV’T
RELATIONS BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015),
http://amablog.modelaircraft.org/amagov/2015/01/28/ama-reacts-to-president-obamamore-regulation-wouldnt-have-prevented-white-house-drone-incident/, archived at
http://perma.cc/Z7SJ-959D.
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“statute of first impression,” so to speak.214 Privacy—particularly outside
of law enforcement contexts—has traditionally been a product of state and
common law.215
[74] Margot Kaminski has made a compelling case for drone
federalism, contending that states are better suited to address the “complex
space” between the privacy and First Amendment rights at stake. 216
Kaminski argues that because federal legislation is more costly, more time
consuming to enact, and more likely to be struck down as unconstitutional,
states are a better laboratory for experimenting with approaches to
commercial and private UAS regulation. 217 Moreover, state legislatures
are capable of tailoring protections to meet new technologies according to
their citizens’ particular needs—for example, it should come of no
surprise that California is one of a few states to pass an anti-paparazzi
law.218
[75]
Another argument made in favor of drone federalism (and privacy
federalism in general) is that it is difficult for a single federal law to
foresee each varied situation that may arise in the future.219
[76] It is possible that a pure federalism model would work well if—as
is probably the case for less-controversial areas of the law—states
cautiously tested the waters of restrictions on civil/commercial drones.
Unfortunately, that does not appear to be the case here; they are diving
214

See Kaminski, supra note 118, at 65.
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See id. at 66.

216

See id. at 59.
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See id. at 64.
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See id. at 66.
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See Kaminski, supra note 118, at 461.
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straight in. 220 The specter of drone warfare and robotic monitoring has
wrought enough damage on drones’ image that, by the time the FAA fully
integrates private UAS in the national airspace, it may be impossible in a
significant number of states to operate one without risking civil or
criminal liability. 221 As mentioned earlier, as long as the third-party
doctrine remains viable, the incentive for states to bring civil drone
restrictions up to speed with moratoria on government surveillance will be
great.222
[77] The states have also done little to demonstrate that they are
concerned with the “complex space” between the First Amendment and
privacy. The Texas Privacy Act, enacted in response to a drone’s
discovery of environmental violations, arguably violates the First
Amendment outright. The cattle industry has sponsored bills in several
states forbidding the recording of farmland.223 Some states, by prohibiting
flights over private property, appear to be straining to reach as much
conduct as existing First Amendment precedent could possibly allow.
[78] Moreover, the Supreme Court’s preference against issuing broad
holdings when privacy and the First Amendment collide suggests that
even some unconstitutional attempts are unlikely to be overturned in one
fell swoop. Instead, courts might invalidate statutes on particular cases’
facts. The result could be that unconstitutional laws persist for some time,
continuing to infringe on First Amendment rights, eroding rather than
being overturned.
220

See generally supra Section III.D.
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See Villasenor, supra note 5, at 500–01.

222

See Kaminski, supra note 118, at 66 (noting that one qualification, in order for drone
federalism to function, is that “Congress must legislatively close the trap door that is the
third-party . . . doctrine”).
223

See id. at 63 (noting that the cattle industry has been sponsoring bills that criminalize
video recording on farms).
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[79] Finally, of the three possible approaches, drone federalism would
result in the greatest level of interstate variation and legal uncertainty.
The aviation industry benefited from a consistent federal approach in
1926, and would again today, to the extent possible.224
C. Federal Regulation of Civil Drones and Privacy
[80] Even if privacy is traditionally within the states’ domain, Congress
also has a pedigree of privacy laws. Existing federal privacy laws are
sectoral, carving out a particular privacy issue; several answer questions
about the relationship between privacy and technology. For example,
federal laws address telephone and electronic communications, 225
standards for the electronic exchange of health care information,226 and the
privacy of children’s personal information online. 227 An act outlining
baseline privacy policies for commercial UAS would not be out of place
on such a list.228
[81]

In addition, Congress’ passing of the FMRA could suggest a

224

Interestingly, today’s argument that privacy is in states’ domain mirrors concerns in
1926 that federal regulation of safety overreached.
225

See generally Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105
Stat. 2394 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012)); Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No.99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C §§ 2510–
22 (2012)).
226

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191 § 261,
110 Stat. 1936, 2021 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)
227

Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501(6), 6502(a)(1)
(2012).
228

Because aircrafts are so closely linked with interstate commerce (especially aircraft
collecting and broadcasting data), I assume, for the purposes of this article, that a federal
legislative scheme would be permissible under the Commerce Clause.
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greater appreciation for the social and economic benefits of commercial
UAV operations than many states currently have. The FMRA predicated
the FAA’s continuing funding on efforts to integrate drones into the
national airspace. 229 The impetus is there for bipartisan support of a
drone-friendly Act: having invested in the UAS industry’s economic
future, it is unlikely Congress would enjoy seeing the market flounder on
state laws (once the FAA lives up to its part of the bargain).
[82] Finally, that federal legislation is more costly and often requires
greater deliberation may in fact translate into better results than those
currently being achieved by the states. While the extent of the First
Amendment right to record is far from clear, Congress could establish
baseline privacy-related rules that would prevent an act from being
categorically stricken. And some privacy interests can be vindicated
without implicating the First Amendment at all, as by enacting
transparency requirements.230
D. The Potential Contents of a Federal Drone Act
[83] Congress’s goals in drafting privacy rules that would govern
commercial UAS should include (in no particular order):
1. Providing the clearest possible guidance to potential UAS
manufacturers, operators, and insurers;
2. To the extent possible, establishing uniformity in
permissible commercial or private UAS activities;
3. Facilitating commerce through enabling the expansion of
beneficial UAS activities;
229

FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95 § 216, 126 Stat. 11
(2012).
230

See Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015, S. 635, 114th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2015). (But note that the Act’s purview reaches far beyond transparency.)
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4. Preventing usurpation by states of UAV operators’ First
Amendment right to information gathering;
5. Avoiding usurpation (to the extent possible) of states’
traditional prerogatives regarding privacy rights;
6. Protecting individuals’ reasonable expectations of privacy
from unwanted recording; and
7. Avoiding Constitutional overreach.
[84] Transparency requirements are already being considered by
Congress. 231 Transparency in UAV operations—if the actual requirements
were crafted to avoid administrative costs—could feasibly serve each of
the above-listed goals. For instance, anyone seeking to operate a UAV in
the national airspace could be required to provide a “data collection
statement” detailing (1) the information to be gathered, and (2) the
information’s intended use. 232 Companies that receive a grant of
authorization for a particular model and purpose could also be permitted to
avoid reapplying, as long as new models were used for the same activities.
By making information about UAS operators available to the public, the
government could assuage some of the same privacy concerns as would
consent requirements (but without running afoul of the First Amendment).
And exemptions could be made for certain categories of aircraft.233
[85] Privacy protections beyond that baseline become trickier.
Congress could follow the lead of some states and prohibit surveillance of
individuals in violation of reasonable expectations of privacy. This would
certainly serve goal #6, and it likely avoids butting up against the First
Amendment (goal #7). The standard it sets, however, is vague and might
231

See id.
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Id. at § 339(a)–(b).

233

The FAA has already proposed a similar scheme in its safety regulations; there is no
reason that privacy regulations could not also be crafted differently to address different
classes of technology. See NPRM, supra n. 8 (considering relaxed regulations for aircraft
weighing under 4.4 lbs).
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vary from state to state—hindering goals #1 and 2. A limited “antipaparazzi” provision might work better. It could prohibit the targeted
collection, or the transmission in interstate commerce, of certain types of
private information or images—obscene photographs and the like.
[86] In order to avoid usurping states’ ability to create their own
privacy standards (goal #5), Congress could expressly disclaim any intent
to occupy fields outside of drone-specific regulation.234
[87] Finally, Congress should exercise care in determining whether and
how a federal Drone Act might preempt state law. While a broadly
preemptive federal privacy statute would be best if market growth and
efficiency were the only concern, such an approach could have several
unfortunate consequences. First, broad preemption would extinguish
states’ abilities to respond to realistic, emerging privacy concerns not
addressed federally. 235 Second, it would virtually ensure that federal rules
will become dated or “ossified” as technology improves. 236 To address
these concerns, Congress could put a time limit on its rules, or employ a
single, narrowly preemptive ceiling. For example, it could establish that
UAVs legally flying in navigable airspace cannot be prohibited from (1)
navigating over private property or (2) recording video or images for
purposes not that will not implicate privacy concerns.
[88] Congress has the will, resources, and impetus to create a baseline
of federal privacy law governing civil drone use. It has a history of
passing bold legislation for the betterment of the aviation industry. It has
already mandated that the FAA begin ushering in a profitable, beneficial
system for UAS operations. Federal guidance on civil drone use might
234

For example, “nothing contained within this Act shall be construed to change the
operation of state laws, existing or forthcoming . . . .”
235

See Kaminski, supra note 118, at 64–66. On the other hand, states would remain free
to rework existing privacy laws so that UAVs fall within their scope.
236

See Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J 902, 927–28 (2009).

51

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 4

assuage states’ concerns about invasion of privacy, and—better still—
foster a system that welcomes interaction between the two levels of
government, simultaneously enabling a valuable industry and protecting
First Amendment rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
[89] It will take time for the FAA to achieve meaningful integration of
commercial drones into the public airspace.237 In the meantime, the states
are ramping up privacy protections that ignore the benefits of unmanned
aircraft, and infringe on First Amendment rights, in favor of privacy
interests that may, in fact, be negligible. 238 This could spell problems for
the future of drones in the United States—especially when the FAA’s
conservative approach to safety regulations already has politicians
concerned about losing our edge over foreign competitors. 239 Privacy
advocates’ attitudes stem from fears that—in many cases—exhibit a
misunderstanding of drones’ profitable uses (and of the burdensome task
of integrating drones in our airspace).240 If states continue to pass laws
237

See generally FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub, L. No. 112-95, 126
Stat. 11 (setting staggered annual and continuing deadlines for the act's integration, e.g.,
certain provisions of the NextGen project requiring an annual update on the progress of
project implementation).
238

See Kaminski, supra note 118, at 57–61.
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See Elizabeth Tennyson, Hearing Reveals FAA Behind on NextGen, UAS,
Consolidation, AOPA (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/AllNews/2014/February/06/FAA-behind-on-NextGen-UAS-and-consolidation-hearingreveals.aspx (”Rep. Bill Shuster, chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee, warned, ‘[t]he aviation industry was invented in America, and we continue to
be the world leader in the airline industry and in aviation manufacturing. But if we’re not
careful and proactive, we could lose our position as the global leader in aviation, just as
we’ve fallen behind in other important industries.’”).
240

See supra Part I. Also, the recent advent of weaponized drones for use in overseas
warfare contributes to these fears, but has no justifiable connection to policy-making in a
commercial context.
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restricting commercial drones, Congress should consider enacting
legislation to preserve a minimum of protection for both privacy interests
and UAS’ legitimate right-of-way.
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